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Abstract 
Past research has consistently shown that female-led ventures tend to receive less funding than 
male-led ventures, but the reasons for this gap are unclear. Drawing on the ambivalent sexism 
theory, this study examines how investors’ benevolent sexism influences funding allocations to 
male- and female-led ventures. In particular, I propose that individuals who endorse benevolent 
sexism are less likely to perceive female-led ventures as viable because they may believe that 
entrepreneurship is too challenging for women due to their dual roles as home-makers and 
entrepreneurs. As a consequence, they may want to protect women from failure by giving 
women less funding as that would make their ventures smaller and easier to manage. I conducted 
an experimental vignette study where investors, i.e., business students with experience with 
early-stage venture context, rated their perceptions of the venture viability and made funding 
allocations for an early-stage venture. Contrary to expectations, benevolent sexism was not 
related to perceptions of venture viability or funding allocation for female-led ventures. 
However, investors’ benevolent sexism was positively associated with perceptions of venture 
viability for male-led ventures, which, in turn, was related to greater funding allocations. 
Although not entirely in line with my hypotheses, the results provided preliminary evidence for 
the role of benevolent sexism in underfunding of female-led ventures by giving men an 
advantage in venture evaluation and funding, while equally qualified women do not get the same 
advantages. Thus, benevolent sexism might be subtly and unnoticeably undermining success of 
female-led ventures. 
Key words: benevolent sexism, entrepreneurship, gender, gender equality, venture 
funding 
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The Gender Gap in Start-up Funding: The Role of Investors’ Benevolent Sexism 
Introduction 
Women own 47% of Canadian firms, contributing approximately $148 billion in 
economic activity annually (Startup Canada, 2018); yet, they continuously face systemic barriers 
such as limited access to funding to start and scale up their business. Similarly, while female-led 
ventures comprise around 40% of all privately held companies in the United States, only 2% of 
venture capital financing is allocated to women (Pitchbook & National Venture Capital 
Association, 2016); and a recent analysis of 6793 companies that successfully secured venture 
capital funding between 2011 and 2013 indicated that less than 3% of these companies had a 
female CEO (Brush, Greene, Balachandra, & Davis, 2018). While these statistics and research 
show that female-led ventures tend to receive less funding than male-led ventures, the underlying 
mechanisms for this gender gap in start-up funding remain unclear (Eddleston, Ladge, Mitteness, 
& Balachandra, 2016). This is problematic because it precludes finding effective solutions to 
curb the problem of underfunding of female-led ventures. 
Past research has implicated sexist attitudes as one important factor underlying this 
gender funding gap (e.g., Balachandra, Briggs, Eddleston, & Brush, 2019; Brooks, Huang, 
Kearney, & Murray, 2014; Eddleston et al., 2016). This past research, however, has focused on 
traditional sexist attitudes, i.e., hostile sexism, which refers to antipathy and generally negative 
attitudes toward women (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Yet, more contemporary views and 
understandings of sexism suggest that in addition to hostile sexist attitudes more seemingly 
positive sexist attitudes also exist, i.e., benevolent sexism, which refers to a sense of affection, 
idealization, and protectiveness toward women (Glick & Fiske, 1996). The omission of the role 
of benevolent sexist attitudes in underfunding of female-led start-ups presents a critical gap 
 2 
because benevolent sexism, unlike hostile sexism, is socially acceptable, widely endorsed, and 
much harder to recognize as sexism (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005; Hopkins-Doyle, Sutton, 
Douglas, & Calogero, 2019; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998). Yet, although it is socially acceptable 
and seemingly benign, its effects significantly and subtly erode gender equality (Cassidy & 
Krendl, 2019; Hideg & Ferris, 2016; Jost & Kay, 2005).  
To address this critical gap, I examine the effects of investors’ benevolent sexist attitudes 
on their funding decisions for male- and female-led ventures. In particular, I draw on social 
psychology research on benevolent sexism and integrate it with the entrepreneurship research on 
gender gap in venture funding, to suggest that the more investors endorse benevolent sexist 
attitudes the less funding they would allocate to female-led ventures. I expect this negative 
relationship between investors’ benevolent sexism and funding of female-led ventures because 
benevolent sexists may perceive that such ventures are not viable given many challenges facing 
women that stem from their dual roles as a home-maker and an entrepreneur, and their gentle and 
fragile nature, which may clash with a highly masculinized culture of entrepreneurship. This 
view may lead benevolent sexist investors to give women lower funding as a way to protect 
women from failure because lower funding would scale back the size of their ventures, thereby 
making them more manageable for women. I tested these propositions in an experimental 
vignette study with a sample of undergraduate business students who have experience with the 
context of early-stage venture funding.  
My research makes important theoretical and practical implications. First, by integrating 
social psychology work on benevolent sexism with entrepreneurship work on gender gap in 
funding, this study identifies a novel and previously overlooked factor in influencing discrepant 
outcomes in funding of male- and female-led ventures, i.e., benevolent sexism. This current work 
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therefore offers a unique perspective regarding the origins of the gender funding gap, which so 
far has been attributed to the perception of women’s inferior competence – a perception that has 
declined across time (Abad-Merino, Dovidio, Tabernero, & González, 2018). Moreover, in 
contrast to majority of work in entrepreneurship that has used archival data sets and hence only 
theorized about underlying effects of sexist attitudes, this paper provides empirical evidence for 
the role of benevolent sexism. Second, the current research contributes to and expands the 
literature on benevolent sexism by examining the effects of benevolent sexist attitudes in the 
context of venture funding. Past research has sparsely examined the consequences of benevolent 
sexism in the workplace and this study contributes to our understanding of how this subtle and 
contemporary form of sexism is undermining women in the work context. In doing so, this study 
also contributes to the broader literature on gender diversity and equality by providing unique 
insights into the reasons underlying the persistence of women’s underrepresentation in 
prestigious occupations. Finally, if benevolent sexist attitudes – attitudes that are seemingly 
positive and highly prevalent – are a reason for the disadvantage women face in financing their 
ventures, then raising more awareness about these effects can play a major role in closing the 
gender gap in entrepreneurial funding. Thus, my work provides useful information for designing 
programs and policies aiming to promote female entrepreneurship. 
Gender Gap in Venture Funding 
 A large body of research has found that female entrepreneurs face significant barriers in 
raising capital for their ventures. For example, past research using archival data sets has found 
that loan applications made by female entrepreneurs are more likely to be denied (Stefani & 
Vacca, 2013); and when they do receive loans, they face tighter credit availability (Bellucci, 
Borisov, & Zazzaro, 2010); and are required to pay higher interest rate (Wu & Chua, 2012); and 
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offer more collateral (Coleman, 2000). These results remain robust even after controlling for 
entrepreneurs’ characteristics such as work experience and education, as well as firms’ 
characteristics such as size and industry sector. In the same vein, experimental studies suggest 
that investors tend to favor pitches narrated by male voices (Brooks et al., 2014), to consider 
male-led ventures as more attractive investments (Bigelow, Lundmark, McLean Parks, & 
Wuebker, 2014), and to ask male entrepreneurs questions regarding attaining gains while asking 
female entrepreneurs questions regarding avoiding losses (Kanze, Huang, Conley, & Higgins, 
2018), all of which lead to lower funding for female-led start-ups. Overall, the literature indicates 
that female entrepreneurs tend to receive lower funding than their male counterparts. 
 Past research has suggested that one of the reasons for this gender gap in start-up funding 
is endorsement of gender stereotypes. More specifically, the stereotypical view of women as 
highly communal but not particularly agentic or competent is incongruent with the masculinized 
image of the ideal entrepreneur (Eddleston et al., 2016; Gupta, Turban, Wasti, & Sikdar, 2009). 
This incongruity leads to the perception that women lack the qualities needed to succeed as 
entrepreneurs (Bigelow et al., 2014; Thébaud, 2015). In addition to competence, scholars have 
also suggested that female entrepreneurs may be evaluated less favorably in terms of 
commitment and trustworthiness. That is, investors may think that women, who often assume the 
home-maker role, are not serious about their businesses and only start them as a hobby (Brush et 
al., 2018; Thébaud, 2015). As a result, women’s commitment as well as the legitimacy of their 
business are often called into question (Brush, Carter, Gatewood, Greene, & Hart, 2004; Carter, 
Shaw, Lam, & Wilson, 2007; Constantinidis, Cornet, & Asandei, 2006). In summary, extant 
research suggests that women are at a disadvantage in raising venture funding because their 
competence and commitment are evaluated negatively. 
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 While past research in this domain has provided important insights into the disadvantages 
women face in the entrepreneurship arena, this body of research is limited for several reasons. 
First, studies on the gender funding gap (with the exception of Gupta and Turban’s 2012 study) 
have only theorized about the role of sexism in investment decisions without actually measuring 
endorsement of sexism, and thus have not provided empirical evidence that sexism is the reason 
behind this gap. Second, past research has relied exclusively on the assumption that differential 
funding outcomes for female- and male-led start-ups is a manifestation of negative sexist view of 
women, while overlooking the effects of positive sexist attitudes, i.e., benevolent sexism. This is 
important as even highly competent and positively evaluated women may still be at disadvantage 
due to more subtle sexist attitudes. 
Benevolent Sexism  
Ambivalent sexism theory posits that attitudes about women are often ambivalent in 
nature in the sense that they reflect both antipathy and affection for women (Glick & Fiske, 
1996). In particular, this theory differentiates between hostile sexism – the perception of women 
as manipulative, deceitful, and inferior to men, and benevolent sexism – the perception of 
women as pure, moral, sensitive, yet weak and fragile. Prior research has demonstrated that 
while hostile sexism is a unidimensional construct, benevolent sexism consists of three 
subdimensions (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Glick et al., 2000). Specifically, benevolent sexism reflects 
the beliefs that (a) men should cherish and protect women (protective paternalism), (b) women 
possess unique characteristics such as purity, warmth, and morality that complement those of 
men such as competence and strength (complementary gender differentiation), and (c) men 
cannot truly be happy without women (heterosexual intimacy). Ambivalent sexism theory marks 
a significant departure from other theories about gender bias, which defines sexism in terms of 
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negative attitudes about women (Glick & Fiske, 1996). In contrast, ambivalent sexism theory 
also considers positive but stereotypical attitudes about women sexist because despite their 
positive tone, they share with hostile sexist attitudes the assumptions of women as weak and only 
suited for traditional gender roles (Glick & Fiske, 1996).  
Yet, unlike hostile sexism, benevolent sexism is oftentimes not considered 
discriminatory, and women are just as likely to make this judgement compared to men (Barreto 
& Ellemers, 2005; Becker, 2010; Hopkins-Doyle et al., 2019). Furthermore, benevolent sexists 
are often evaluated positively in many respects. For example, women show higher levels of 
preference for and attraction to benevolent sexist men compared to non-sexist men (Bohner, 
Ahlborn, & Steiner, 2010; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998; Montañés, Lemus, Moya, Bohner, & 
Megías, 2013), and both men and women perceive benevolent sexists as supporters of women’s 
empowerment (Hopkins-Doyle et al., 2019). In addition to being more socially acceptable, 
benevolent sexism is also more widely endorsed than hostile sexism (Abad-Merino et al., 2018; 
King et al., 2012). Finally, women do not differ substantially from men in the extent to which 
they hold these beliefs (Becker, 2010).  
Despite its prevalence and its ostensibly positive tone, past research has shown that 
benevolent sexist attitudes ultimately undermine gender equality. For example, benevolent 
sexism imposes limits on various aspects of women’s lives, with research showing its 
relationship with disapproval of public breastfeeding (Acker, 2009), restrictions of women’s 
dating behaviours (Viki, Abrams, & Hutchison, 2003), and opposition of women’s abortion 
rights (Huang, Osborne, Sibley, & Davies, 2014). In addition, benevolent sexism has been linked 
to helping behaviours that reinforce women’s dependency on others rather than empowering 
them (Shnabel, Bar-Anan, Kende, Bareket, & Lazar, 2016). Benevolent sexism also undermines 
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women in the workplace. For example, past research has found that benevolent sexists support 
the hiring of women into feminine positions but not into masculine positions, thus subtly 
encouraging women to stay within their expected occupational sphere (Hideg & Ferris, 2016). 
Further, benevolent sexist managers are less likely to assign challenging developmental tasks and 
opportunities to women, which are needed for downstream promotions and other workplace 
rewards and advancements (King et al., 2012). Past theorizing has also suggested that benevolent 
sexism is related to lower career support for women (Hideg & Shen, 2019). In conclusion, while 
positive in tone, endorsed by both men and women, and not recognized as discriminatory in 
nature, benevolent sexism is dangerous for gender equality and as I discuss below may have 
important implications for funding of female-led ventures.  
Theory Development 
Given that benevolent sexists feel protective toward women, I expect investors holding 
benevolent sexist ideologies to want to protect female entrepreneurs from failure and this 
protection may manifest in a form of lower funding. More specifically, because benevolent 
sexists subscribe to traditional gender roles in which women adopt the role of homemaker and 
men of breadwinner (Glick & Fiske, 1996), they may be more likely to assume that female 
entrepreneurs are responsible for most care-taking responsibilities at home. As such, they may 
believe that female entrepreneurs will struggle to fulfil their domestic duties and run a business 
at the same time. Further, entrepreneurship represents a highly masculine domain where success 
requires entrepreneurs to be not only creative and intelligent, but also bold, competitive, 
aggressive, and assertive (Balachandra et al., 2019; Jennings & Brush, 2013; Gupta & Turban, 
2012). This image of a successful entrepreneur stands in stark contrast with how benevolent 
sexists view women – kind, gentle, nurturing, and fragile, which may lead them to believe that 
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the entrepreneurship environment is too harsh for women’s gentle and fragile nature. The 
perceived severity of the entrepreneurship culture coupled with the perceived burden of women’s 
dual roles as home-maker and entrepreneur may lead to the expectation that ventures founded by 
women are likely to fail. In other words, benevolent sexists may believe that female 
entrepreneurs would experience many challenges and consequently face a high chance of failure.  
Hypothesis 1: There is an interaction between investors’ benevolent sexism and gender of 
the entrepreneur in predicting perceptions of venture viability such that investors’ 
benevolent sexism is negatively related to perceptions of viability for female-led ventures, 
whereas male-led ventures are less likely to be influenced by investors’ benevolent 
sexism.  
Because benevolent sexists believe that women should be protected and provided for, the 
perception that female-led ventures are less likely to succeed may, in turn, evoke the desire to 
protect female entrepreneurs from failure. One way to accomplish this may be to give women 
lower funding as that would scale back the size of their ventures. By making female-led ventures 
smaller and therefore easier to manage, benevolent sexist investors may believe that they are 
helping women fulfil their responsibilities at work and at home. This line of reasoning coupled 
with the theorizing above and the previous hypothesis leads to the prediction of a moderated 
mediation relationship in which investors’ benevolent sexist attitudes indirectly decrease funding 
allocations via lower perceptions of venture viability, but only when the venture is founded by 
women, not men (see Figure 1).  
Hypothesis 2: There is a moderated mediation effect such that investors’ benevolent 
sexism has an indirect negative effect on funding allocation for female-led ventures via 
reduced perceptions of viability, whereas such effect is weaker for male-led ventures. 
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Method 
Participants and Procedures  
 I recruited 395 business undergraduate students who completed the study in exchange for 
a partial course credit and a chance to win a $50 gift card. There were 39 participants who failed 
manipulation check for the entrepreneur’s gender. As such, the final sample consisted of 356 
participants, of whom 58% identified as male (n = 206), 41% as female (n = 147), and the rest 
preferred not to answer (n = 3). In terms of ethnicity, 50% of the final sample identified as 
Caucasian (n = 177), 19% as South Asian (n = 68), 18% as East Asian (n = 63), 7% as Southeast 
Asian (n = 24), 5% as Middle Eastern (n = 17), 2% as West Indian (n = 8), 2% as Black (n = 6), 
1% as Hispanic (n = 5), and the rest indicated they either belong to a different ethnic group (n = 
10) or prefer not to answer (n = 10). The average age was 19.76 years (SD = 1.44). All 
participants were upper-year students at a Canadian university who had participated in a new 
venture competition.  As a part of this venture competition, they worked in teams for an 
academic year to develop a business plan for a new venture idea and present it to the judges and 
their peers for a chance to win scholarship funds. Thus, participants were familiar with the 
context of early-stage venture.  
 The study consisted of two ostensibly unrelated parts, both of which took place in a 
laboratory. Participants were told that part 1 is about entrepreneurial funding decisions, and part 
2 about personality. In part 1, I asked participants to imagine they work for a firm and their task 
is to evaluate and make a funding decision for an early-stage venture. Following Tinkler, 
Whittington, Ku, and Davies's (2015) procedures, participants were informed that the venture 
presented has been evaluated by experienced investors and four participants whose evaluations 
match those of the investors would receive a $50 gift card. This was done to make the purpose of 
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the study (i.e., examining gender differences in venture funding) less salient and to motivate 
participants to maximize profit, thereby reducing social desirability bias. In reality, all 
participants were entered into a random draw to receive one of the four $50 gift cards. Next, 
participants were assigned to either a male or female entrepreneur condition where they read a 
biography of the entrepreneur and an executive summary of a business plan for an early-stage 
venture. The biography and the business plan presented in two conditions were identical; the 
only difference was the gender of the entrepreneur. After reading these materials, participants 
completed a measure assessing their perceptions of viability of the proposed venture and their 
proposed funding allocation. Participants then proceeded to part 2 where they completed 
measures of ambivalent sexism and self-esteem (the latter served as filler items). Finally, they 
responded to a manipulation check about the entrepreneur’s gender and reported demographic 
information.  
Materials and Manipulations  
 In both the male and female entrepreneur condition, the entrepreneur was described as 
holding an undergraduate degree and an MBA degree. Participants were also informed that the 
entrepreneur has had 5 years of managerial experience in the energy industry – the same industry 
their venture is in (see Appendix A). Following the biography, all participant read an executive 
summary of a business plan for a new venture providing home energy solutions, which was 
adapted from Lee and Huang’s 2018 study (see Appendix B).1 
                                                 
1 I chose a gender-neutral venture for this first test of the role of benevolent sexism in venture funding in order to 
assess more baseline effects of benevolent sexism as the industry type (i.e., male- vs. female-dominated) is likely to 
exacerbate or attenuate the effects of benevolent sexism. A pilot study conducted with a different sample of 400 
undergraduate business students showed that the venture is perceived to be in a gender-neutral industry (i.e., not a 
male- or female-dominated). This is consistent with what Lee and Huang (2018) found in their pretesting of the 
stimuli on a sample of 150 MTurk employees. 
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The gender of the entrepreneur was indicated in the biography and the business plan. 
Following Bigelow et al.'s (2014) procedures, I manipulated the entrepreneur’s gender via names 
(i.e., Jennifer Wilson vs. Robert Wilson) and gender pronouns (she vs. he; her vs. his). To further 
make the gender of the entrepreneur salient, in line with past research I included a silhouette of a 
woman or a man in the entrepreneur’s biography (Ikram, 2018; Luo & Salterio, 2018; Plaza, 
Boiché, Brunel, & Ruchaud, 2017). 
Measures   
Benevolent and hostile sexism. In addition to measuring benevolent sexism, I also 
measured hostile sexism because past research has shown that the two types of sexism are 
positively correlated (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Glick et al., 2000; Sibley & Becker, 2012). To parse 
out the unique effects of benevolent sexism, hostile sexism was included as a control variable in 
all of my analyses. Participants’ endorsement of benevolent and hostile sexism was measured 
using the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory developed by Glick and Fiske (1996). This scale consists 
of 22 items, half of which measure benevolent sexism (e.g., “A good woman should be set on a 
pedestal by her man”) and the other half hostile sexism (e.g., “Many women are actually seeking 
special favors, such as hiring policies that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for 
“equality.””). Participants rated the extent to which they agree with 22 statements on a scale that 
ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The benevolent sexism and hostile 
sexism scores were computed by averaging 11 items measuring benevolent sexism and hostile 
sexism respectively.  
Venture viability. Perceptions of venture viability were measured with 2 items 
developed by Lee and Huang (2018). Participants rated the extent to which they agree that the 
venture will “grow to have 100+ employees at some point in the future” and “be successful in 
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getting the financial investment it needs to grow” on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree). The viability scores were computed by averaging these two items. 
Funding allocation. Following past research measuring start-up funding decisions 
(Kanze et al., 2018), I asked participants to indicate the amount they would like to invest in the 
venture out of $100,000 in total available funds.  
Manipulation check. The manipulation check asked participants to indicate the gender 
of the entrepreneur they evaluated. 
Results 
Manipulation check. I conducted a Chi-square test of independence on the full sample 
(N = 395) to test whether the experimental manipulation of entrepreneur’s gender was successful. 
As expected, the results showed that whether participants identified the entrepreneur as a man or 
a woman depended on the experimental condition to which they were assigned, 𝒳2(1) = 254.97, 
p < .001. Specifically, participants in the male entrepreneur condition were more likely to 
indicate that the entrepreneur they evaluated was a man than participants in the female 
entrepreneur condition (92% vs. 8%). Similarly, participants in the female entrepreneur condition 
were more likely to indicate that the entrepreneur they evaluated was a woman in comparison to 
participants in the male entrepreneur condition (88% vs. 12%). Thus, the manipulation of 
entrepreneur’s gender was successful. Subsequent analyses were conducted on the sample 
consisting of participants who did not fail manipulation check for the entrepreneur’s gender (N = 
356). 
Preliminary analyses. Means and standard deviations of each variable, Cronbach’s 
alpha, and correlations between the variables are provided in Table 1. In line with past research, 
there was a positive correlation between benevolent and hostile sexism, r = .42, p < .001. There 
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were also gender differences in endorsement of sexism: men, compared to women, endorsed 
more hostile sexism (men: M = 3.15, SD = .90; women: M = 2.51, SD = .86; t(351) = 6.71, p < 
.001), and more benevolent sexism (men: M = 3.42, SD = .78; women: M = 3.04, SD = .78, 
t(351) = 4.52, p < .001), although the gender gap in endorsement of benevolent sexism was 
smaller.  
 Before testing my main hypotheses, I also examined whether participants’ gender 
moderates the effect of entrepreneur’s gender on entrepreneurial outcomes. The interaction 
between entrepreneur’s gender and participants’ gender was not significant in predicting either 
perceived venture viability, F(1, 349) = 2.80, p = .095; or funding allocations, F(1, 348) = 0.10, 
p = .755. Thus, women and men do not seem to differ in their evaluations and funding decisions 
for female- and male-led ventures. 
The interactive effect of investors’ benevolent sexism and entrepreneur’s gender on 
perceptions of venture viability. Hypothesis 1 stated that investors’ benevolent sexism would 
be associated with reduced perceptions of venture viability for female-led venture, but not male-
led venture. To test this prediction, I ran a hierarchical moderated regression analysis to test the 
interactive effect of investors’ benevolent sexism and entrepreneur’s gender on perceived 
venture viability. Hostile sexism was entered in step 1 as a control variable, followed by the main 
effects of benevolent sexism and entrepreneur’s gender in step 2, and the interaction between 
benevolent sexism and entrepreneur’s gender in step 3. Following Cohen, Cohen, West, and 
Aiken’s (2003) recommendations, benevolent and hostile sexism scores were mean-centered to 
improve interpretability. Table 2 displays the results of this regression model.  
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As seen in Table 2, the interaction between benevolent sexism and entrepreneur’s gender 
was significant in predicting perceptions of venture viability, b = −.37, p = .040.2 I followed up 
on this significant interaction with simple slope analyses. Counter to expectations, a simple slope 
analysis revealed a positive relationship between investors’ benevolent sexism and their 
perceptions of viability for a male-led venture, b = .46, p = .001; but not for a female-led venture, 
b = .09, p = .447 (see Figure 2). Thus, the more individuals endorsed benevolent sexist attitudes 
the more viable they perceived male-led venture to be, whereas benevolent sexism did not relate 
to viability perceptions of female-led venture.  While these results did not support Hypothesis 1 
in its proposed form, they suggest that benevolent sexism contributes to the gender gap in 
entrepreneurial outcomes by specifically supporting male entrepreneurs, without any seeming 
support for female entrepreneurs.  
The moderated mediation effect. Hypothesis 2 proposed a moderated mediation model 
in which the effect of investors’ benevolent sexism on funding allocations would be mediated by 
perceptions of venture viability, and this effect would be stronger for female-led ventures and 
weaker for male-led ventures. I tested this hypothesis using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro 
(model 7 with 10,000 bootstrap samples), with benevolent sexism as the predictor variable, 
entrepreneur’s gender as the moderator, perceived venture viability as the mediator, and funding 
allocation as the outcome variable. The results of this analysis are provided in Table 3.  
As discussed above and also as seen in Table 3, the interactive effect of benevolent 
sexism and entrepreneur’s gender was significant in predicting perceptions of venture viability in 
the first stage (although the pattern of this interaction was not as proposed); and the effect of 
perceived venture viability was significant in predicting funding allocation in the second stage, b 
                                                 
2 The 3-way interaction between benevolent sexism, entrepreneur’s gender, and participants’ gender, was not 
significant in predicting perceptions of venture viability, b = .09, p = .812. 
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= 8030.21, p < .001. Further, the conditional indirect effect of investors’ benevolent sexism on 
funding allocations, mediated by perceptions of venture viability, was significant in the male 
entrepreneur condition (conditional indirect effect = 3786.92, 95% confidence interval [CI] 
[1793.54, 5955.54]), but not in the female entrepreneur condition (conditional indirect effect = 
730.37, 95% CI [-1332.41, 2723.27]). Finally, the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval for the 
difference between the two indirect effects excludes 0, further indicating that the indirect effect 
of investors’ benevolent sexism on funding via perceived venture viability in the male 
entrepreneur condition is significantly different from the indirect effect in the female 
entrepreneur condition (index of moderated mediation = −3056.55, 95% CI [−5891.07, 
−437.70]). In other words, it seems that the more investors hold benevolent sexist beliefs the 
more likely they are to perceive male-led venture, but not female-led venture, as viable, which in 
turns leads to higher funding for male-led venture. 
 Additional analyses. I also conducted a set of hierarchical moderated regression analyses 
to explore the possibility that the subdimensions of benevolent sexism (i.e., protective 
paternalism, complementary gender differentiation, and heterosexual intimacy) differentially 
affect entrepreneurial outcomes for men and women. In light of my theorizing that benevolent 
sexists might allocate lower funding to female-led ventures as a way to protect women from 
failure because they view female-led ventures as less viable, I expected protective paternalism 
(i.e., the view of women as weak and in need of protection) to be the strongest predictor of 
venture viability perceptions. Contrary to expectations, the interaction between protective 
paternalism and entrepreneur’s gender was not significant in predicting perceptions of venture 
viability, b = −.22, p = .131; and neither was the interaction between heterosexual intimacy and 
entrepreneur’s gender, b = −.09, p = .521.  
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The interaction between complementary gender differentiation and entrepreneur’s 
gender, however, significantly predicted perceived venture viability, b = −.27, p = .036. A 
simple slope analysis showed a significant positive relationship between investors’ endorsement 
of complementary gender differentiation and their perceptions of venture viability for male-led 
venture, b = .29, p = .003; but not for female-led venture, b = .02, p = .850. Finally, the 
conditional indirect effect of complementary gender differentiation on funding allocations via 
viability perceptions was significant with male-led venture (conditional indirect effect = 2338.65, 
95% CI [954.37, 3864.58]), and not female-led venture (conditional indirect effect = 149.31, 
95% CI [−1258.29, 1626.31]). These findings suggest that the effect of benevolent sexism on the 
gender gap in funding outcomes may be driven by the beliefs that men and women each have 
unique characteristics that complement each other (e.g., men are strong, bold, and assertive, but 
women are not; whereas women are warm, virtuous, and nurturing, but men are not). This 
finding is in line with the notion that typical female traits may not be well aligned with 
entrepreneurship, which may lead to lower perceptions of venture viability. 
Discussion 
 In this study, I examined the effect of investors’ benevolent sexism on gender differences 
in start-up funding. I originally expected that the more investors endorse benevolent sexism the 
less they would perceive female-led ventures as viable and consequently would allocate lower 
funding to those ventures, whereas the effect of benevolent sexism on male-led ventures would 
be weaker. However, contrary to these expectations, I found a positive relationship between 
endorsement of benevolent sexism and perceptions of venture viability for male-led ventures, 
and no effects of benevolent sexism on female-led ventures. While on surface these results may 
appear to be opposite from the proposed hypotheses, they still point out to subtle ways in which 
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benevolent sexism undermines women. Specifically, while appearing to be harmless to women’s 
entrepreneurship, benevolent sexist attitudes elevate men’s chances of securing funding while 
seemingly not influencing women’s chances for funding. As such, although not completely in 
line with the proposed hypotheses, my work provides initial evidence of the subtle and difficult 
to detect, yet harmful, effects of benevolent sexism on women’s ability to succeed in 
entrepreneurship. In doing so, my research makes important contributions to the 
entrepreneurship literature and the sexism literature and more broadly the literature on gender 
equality. 
Contributions to the Entrepreneurship Literature  
The current research contributes to the study of gender inequality in entrepreneurship. As 
noted previously, past research in this domain has mostly focused on the main effect of 
entrepreneurs’ gender on funding outcomes, showing that female entrepreneurs tend to receive 
less funding than male entrepreneurs. Largely absent from the literature is research on the 
mechanisms driving this effect. The current study addresses this gap by theorizing and 
empirically testing the relationship between investors’ benevolent sexism and their funding 
decisions. In doing so, I provide evidence for one potential mechanism driving the discrepant 
outcomes in funding of male- and female-led ventures, namely, benevolent sexism. That is, I 
demonstrate that people who endorse benevolent sexism tend to evaluate male-led ventures more 
positively and consequently allocate higher levels of funding to these ventures while failing to 
provide the same level of support to female-led ventures. This finding is noteworthy given that 
the entrepreneur was portrayed as having strong educational and professional credentials. Yet, 
despite of strong and equal qualifications of the male and female entrepreneur, the male 
entrepreneur was favored for funding. This is very concerning and dangerous for gender equality 
 18 
as on surface it appears that benevolent sexism does not influence viability perceptions of 
women-led ventures and their consequent funding, while at the same time gives men an 
advantage. Thus, although it may appear that there are no biases at play, the bias is subtly 
playing out by giving men a leg up in the process, while equally qualified women are not 
receiving the same benefits leaving them behind men.  
Further, while the finding that investors’ benevolent sexism was not related to women’s 
entrepreneurial outcomes was not in line with my theorizing, it is in line with other recent 
research on the effects of benevolent sexism on gender equality. For example, Hideg and Ferris 
(2016) found that benevolent sexism is unrelated to support for employment policies promoting 
the hiring of women in traditional masculine positions, while at the same time it was positively 
related to promotion of women in traditional feminine positions. That is, while on surface 
benevolent sexism was not related to any negative outcomes for women’s hiring and moreover it 
also appeared beneficial for women’s hiring, it undermined gender equality by subtly segregating 
women into typical feminine positions. Further, Masser and Abrams (2004) found no evidence of 
a relationship between endorsement of benevolent sexism and evaluations of women applying to 
be a manager – a stereotypically masculine position. Similarly, Cassidy and Krendl (2019) did 
not find a significant relationship between benevolent sexism and expectation of female 
politicians’ success, but they found that beneovlent sexists were more likely to expect male 
politicians to be successful. Thus, my findings point out that the effects of contemporary sexist 
attitudes on the funding of female-led ventures are more complex than previously postulated and 
difficult to observe and be recognized as harmful given their apparent no effects on women’s 
funding outcomes. That is, the harmful effects of benevolent sexism are difficult to recognize 
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because there are no direct effects on women’s funding outcomes, but rather those effects are 
indirect by giving an advantage to men who are no more qualified than women.  
  My additional analyses involving the three subdimensions of benevolent sexism suggest 
that the main driver behind the positive effect of benevolent sexism on men’s funding outcomes 
is the complementary gender differentiation component, which reflects the notion that men and 
women have their own unique strengths and weaknesses (Glick & Fiske, 1996). As Jost and Kay 
(2005) argued, this notion suggests that men and women are suited to different roles in society 
that are complementary and equally important, thereby implying that the traditional gender 
division of labor is fair, natural, and even inevitable. This finding is aligned with the notion that 
entrepreneurship is viewed as a very masculine domain and hence traditional women’s traits are 
incongruent with entrepreneurial role and success.    
Contributions to the Sexism Literature  
My work also contributes to the nascent study of benevolent sexism in the workplace by 
providing a more complete picture of how this ideology affects men and women’s career 
outcomes. First, my work contributes to the emerging work on the effects of benevolent sexism 
on women’s career advancements by showing that while benevolent sexism appears to be related 
to seemingly positive evaluations of women and on the surface it does not appear to be 
undermining women, it subtly undermines their success in the fields and occupations 
traditionally occupied by men. This is problematic as benevolent sexism seems to erode 
women’s chances of succeeding in most prestigious occupations where we currently see a severe 
underrepresentation of women. Thus, my work points out to a novel way in which benevolent 
sexism undermines women’s entry and success in prestigious occupations in the context of 
entrepreneurship.  
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Second, this study is among the first to uncover how men are affected by benevolent 
sexism. Specifically, my results indicated a positive impact of investors’ benevolent sexism on 
perceived viability and subsequently funding allocations for male-led ventures, but not female-
led ventures. This finding parallels the results of Cassidy and Krendl’s 2019 study that showed a 
positive association between benevolent sexism and expectation of men’s, not women’s, success 
in politics. Benevolent sexism, however, does not seem to uniformly benefit men in all 
professions, but only those in traditional masculine fields. Indeed, Clow, Ricciardelli, and 
Bartfay (2015) found that benevolent sexists tend to disapprove of nursing as a profession for 
men. Taken together, it is possible that benevolent sexism imposes even more restrictions on 
men’s career choices than women’s career choices in the sense that while benevolent sexists 
support men and women working in their expected occupational spheres, they do not oppose to 
women working in traditional masculine fields but they disapprove of men pursuing careers in 
traditional feminine fields. This line of reasoning is in line with the tenets of precarious manhood 
theory, which proposes that unlike womanhood, manhood is a social status that is hard-earned 
and easily lost and thus must be maintained through constant display of masculine behaviours 
(Vandello, Bosson, Cohen, Burnaford, & Weaver, 2008). Overall, my work not only contributes 
to the limited research on the manifestations of benevolent sexism in the workplace context, but 
also emphasizes the value of taking both men’s and women’s career outcomes into consideration.  
Contributions to the Gender Diversity and Equality Literature 
My research also informs the broader literature on gender diversity and equality in the 
workplace. Entrepreneurship has been hailed as a solution to the persistence of workplace gender 
inequality (Heilman & Chen, 2003). Indeed, many have argued that because the culture of 
entrepreneurship places innovative ideas above all else, investment decisions are less affected by 
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gender bias, thus allowing women to reduce barriers to advancement in traditional organization 
settings (Tinkler et al., 2015). In addition, entrepreneurship also presents a more autonomous 
career path for women as it gives women more control over when and how they conduct their 
work, and consequently makes it easier for them to achieve work-life balance (Heilman & Chen, 
2003; Lee & Huang, 2018; Thébaud, 2015). However, as described above, research consistently 
demonstrates a disadvantage for women in the venture funding process. My research suggests 
that solely encouraging women’s entry into entrepreneurship might not solve the problems 
women face in traditional organization settings because of the prevalence of benevolent sexism. 
Moreover, given that benevolent sexism is socially acceptable, and its negative effects tend to be 
subtle, investors’ behaviours that appear to be motivated by benevolent sexist attitudes are likely 
to remain unchallenged.  
Limitations and Future Directions  
While this study provides initial and novel evidence for the role of benevolent sexism in 
the gender gap in venture funding, it is important to note a few limitations. First, the use of 
undergraduate business students as participants calls into the question the generalizability of the 
findings and external validity because of students’ limited experience with evaluating ventures 
and making investment allocations. To alleviate these concerns I used a student sample that had 
recent experience with entrepreneurial proposals and venture funding. In addition, I also used a 
highly immersive vignette methodology with a purpose to create a highly realistic scenarios and 
thus increase external validity (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014). Still future research should examine 
the effects of benevolent sexism on funding allocations and evaluations of female-led ventures 
with full-time employees and experienced investors. Moreover, future research should seek to 
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constructively replicate these findings and provide robustness for these results given that the 
current paper involves only one data set (Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012). 
Second, this paper does not establish causal effects of benevolent sexism since 
benevolent sexism was measured. One way for future research to establish causal effects of 
benevolent sexism is to manipulate it. This manipulation has been done by previous research 
where participants are asked to memorize either benevolent sexist statements or gender 
stereotype-neutral statements, thereby priming the experimental group with benevolent sexist 
stereotypes without doing so for the control group (Becker & Wright, 2011; Hideg & Ferris, 
2016; Shnabel et al., 2016). Thus, additional research that manipulates rather than measuring 
benevolent sexism is needed to increase confidence in the causal role of benevolent sexist 
attitudes on differential funding outcomes for female and male entrepreneurs. 
Future research could also examine the potential moderating role of women’s levels of 
competence in the relationship between benevolent sexism and funding of female-led ventures. 
Since participants in my study were presented with a profile of a highly competent female 
entrepreneur, it would be interesting to examine whether benevolent sexists would give lower 
funding to women as a way to protect them from failure in cases where information about 
women’s competence is ambiguous or missing. Another potential moderator of the effects of 
benevolent sexism is the industry of the venture. In this study, participants evaluated a gender-
neutral venture. It is possible that the effects found in this study would be alleviated when the 
venture is in a female-dominated field, and amplified when the venture is in a male-dominated 
field. Future research therefore should examine these proposed moderators as well as other 
moderators in order to gain a deeper understanding of how benevolent sexism manifests in 
entrepreneurship. 
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Practical Implications  
 In recent years, there has been an exponential growth in the number of initiatives and 
policies designed to promote women’s participation in entrepreneurship. Despite these efforts, 
gender differences in funding outcomes persist. My work suggests that one important factor 
contributing to the persistence of gender inequality in entrepreneurship might be benevolent 
sexist attitudes. What makes these attitudes particularly harmful is their ostensibly positive tone 
toward women, which renders their negative consequences harder to detect (Glick & Fiske, 
1996). My work provides empirical evidence that benevolent sexist attitudes endorsed by 
investors influence them to support male-led ventures without doing so for female-led ventures. 
This information can be incorporated into intervention programs to raise awareness among 
investors and entrepreneurs about the negative effects of this highly endorsed and seemingly 
positive type of sexism. 
Conclusion 
 In this current study I investigated how benevolent sexism affects funding outcomes for 
male- and female-led ventures. I found empirical evidence that while investors’ endorsement of 
benevolent sexist attitudes is not related to funding for female-led venture, it is associated with 
higher funding for male-led venture via enhanced perceptions of venture viability. Thus, my 
findings demonstrate that at first glance, benevolent sexism may appear harmless to women’s 
ability to secure funding. However, it subtly undermines gender equality in entrepreneurship by 
increasing support for male-led ventures while failing to provide the same level of support to 
female-led ventures. By highlighting the important role benevolent sexism plays in the gender 
gap in venture funding, I hope to stimulate more research into the effects of this subtle and 
contemporary form of sexism in the workplace.   
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Appendix B: Business Plan 
GreenGlass 
Robert Wilson, Founder/CEO 
Company Overview 
GreenGlass is a home energy solutions company that offers homeowners a low-risk opportunity 
to cut cost on energy bills. 
Problem 
Most homeowners think about their utilities as something that’s out of their control. A massive 
amount of energy is wasted in homes on a daily basis through poor insulation and outdated 
heating and cooling systems. This drives utility bills up. Homeowners know that they are 
spending a lot on electricity but lack clear solutions.  
Solution  
GreenGlass offers homeowners a low-risk opportunity to save money. The first step is a home 
energy assessment, which will give you information about your current energy loss. Depending 
on the assessment and local energy prices, we may recommend a number of solutions that reduce 
energy waste, including new insulation, new heating or cooling systems, or even solar panels. 
When we recommend improvements, we also offer the opportunity to finance them through a 
unique co-investment model.  
Market Opportunity 
Our business model addresses a huge opportunity. There are over 60 million free-standing homes 
in the United States and 7.5 million in Canada, and the average home is over thirty years old. 
Energy prices are only going up.  
Competitive Advantage 
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By co-investing in these improvements with homeowners, we’ll share in both the costs and 
benefits of making homes more energy efficient. Our scale also allows us to negotiate favorable 
terms with contractors and materials providers. We are currently in pilot with 10 clients. As we 
continue to develop scale and expertise, we will become more and more efficient at the best 
ways to save money. 
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, Cronbach’s Alphas, and Correlations  
 Male founder (n = 175) Female founder (n = 181) Overall (n = 356) 1 2 3 4 
1. Participant gender        
2. Benevolent sexism  3.23 (.80) 3.30 (.80) 3.26 (.80) −0.23*** (.77)   
3. Hostile sexism  2.95 (.98) 2.83 (.91) 2.89 (.95) −0.34***    .42*** (.88)  
4. Venture viability 4.57 (1.41) 4.67 (1.32) 4.62 (1.36)    .17**   .14** −.16**  (0.73) 
5. Funding allocations 35435.31 (24380.08) 38817.98 (23257.24) 37160.00 (23840.70)    .18**  .11* −.12*  0.46*** 
Note. Gender is coded as 1 = men and 2 = women.  
Columns labeled “male founder”, “female founder”, and “overall” display means and standard deviations, with standard deviations in parentheses. Columns 
labeled “1”, “2”, “3” and “4” display correlations and Cronbach’s alpha, with Cronbach’s alpha in parentheses. Column labeled “2” displays partial 
correlations controlling for hostile sexism, except for the zero-order correlation between benevolent and hostile sexism. Column labeled “3” displays partial 
correlations controlling for benevolent sexism. 
Benevolent and hostile sexism were measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 6, venture viability was measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 7, and funding 
allocations were measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100,000.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 2 
Regression Analyses Result 
Predictors 
Venture viability 
∆ 𝑅2 b 𝛽 95% CI 
Step 1  .01*    
     Hostile Sexism  −.16* −.11* [−.31, −.01] 
Step 2 .02*    
     Benevolent sexism       .26**     .15**     [.01, .07] 
     Condition   .05   .02     [−.23, .33] 
Step 3 .01*    
     Benevolent sexism × Condition  −.37* −.35* [−.72, −.02] 
Total 𝑅2 .04** 
Note. CI = confidence interval. Condition is coded as 1 = male entrepreneur and 2 = female entrepreneur.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 3.  
Coefficient estimates for the moderated mediation model  
Variable 
Stage 1 (dependent variable: perceived viability) Stage 2 (dependent variable: funding allocations) 
b SE t 95% CI b SE t 95% CI 
Constant  2.61 .94    2.78 ** [.76, 4.45]   −937.57 6287.64 −.15 [−13303.76, 11428.62] 
Hostile sexism −.27 .08 −3.30 ** [−.44, −.11] −1293.59 1328.81 −.97  [−3907.03, 1319.85] 
Benevolent Sexism    .85 .29    2.93 ** [.28, 1.42]    1423.64 1568.16    .91 [−1660.54, 4507.82] 
Condition  1.27 .60    2.13 * [.10, 2.44]     
Benevolent sexism × Condition −.38 .18 −2.14 * [−.73, −.03]     
Venture viability         8030.21   847.45  9.48*** [6363.49, 9696.92] 
Total 𝑅2 .04** .22*** 
Note. CI = confidence interval. Condition is coded as 1 = male entrepreneur and 2 = female entrepreneur.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .00
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Figure 1. The interaction between investors’ benevolent sexism and entrepreneur’s gender 
indirectly affects funding allocations via perceived venture viability. 
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Figure 2. An interaction between investors’ benevolent sexism and entrepreneur’s gender in 
predicting perceived venture viability. 
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